Behind the scene political scrabble

Published by Asia Times, Feb. 18, 2012 at

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NB18Ae03.html

Thailand's Thaksin prepares for war

By John Cole and Steve Sciacchitano 

Newly appointed Thai Minister of Defense Air Chief Marshal Sukampon Suwannathat is quietly planning to activate a new "war room", or secretive unofficial command center, to direct mass pro-government "red-shirt" demonstrations planned for the coming months, according to senior Thai military sources familiar with the situation. 

The war room, created at the direction of fugitive former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, will become operational by June, the same sources say. The senior military sources say that Thaksin, who lives in self-exile in the United Arab Emirates, ordered that Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, his younger sister, be kept in the dark about the war room's creation so that she may honestly deny its existence if questioned by the press.  

Whether the announced red-shirt demonstrations are planned to pre-emptively take control of Bangkok's streets ahead of a possible new crisis, or plotted as a defensive strategy to counter any move by the military or anti-government protest groups, the war room's creation signals the seriousness with which Thaksin views the potential for renewed open conflict. 

Two issues that could stoke new bouts of instability are already at hand. The ruling Puea Thai party has commenced a process to gain parliamentary approval to draft a new constitution, a move widely perceived among Thaksin's critics as aimed at voiding his criminal conviction for corruption and its attendant two-year jail term, and his return to Thailand as a free man.  

Another initiative to give more civilian control over the promotion and assignment of senior military officers has the potential to spark a more direct military response. As currently written, the law gives de facto authority over these decisions to the three uniformed services' commander-in-chiefs. Yingluck's government, however, is driving to give more power to the government-appointed civilian minister of defense over those decisions.  

Should the law be amended, Thaksin would be in a stronger position to elevate his loyalists into key command positions and remove key detractors, including current army commander-in-chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha, a known favorite of the royal palace. Such moves would aim to neutralize the army's ability to stage a coup against the elected government led by his younger sister. 

Underscoring the gravity of the situation, a similar struggle over military assignments was a proximate cause of the 2006 military coup that toppled Thaksin's elected administration. In the run-up to the military reshuffle in October 2005, Thaksin attempted to place loyalists in key jobs that would have put them in line the following year for promotion to top positions, including the commanderships of the three uniformed services.  

When Privy Council president General Prem Tinsulanonda, a former prime minister and army commander and current top royal adviser, learned of Thaksin's interventions he challenged the list and denied it royal endorsement until it was changed. A behind-the-scenes power struggle ensued that ultimately resulted in the 2006 coup. It was during this initial struggle that top military officers began to realize that Thaksin was vulnerable and could be overthrown.  

Secret commands In the spring of 2006, prior to the coup staged in September that year, Thaksin ordered the creation of a secret operations center, a move that was not widely recognized at the time among the military establishment. (The Thaksin-created war room that oversaw the 2010 red-shirt protests that devolved into violence, however, was more widely known to senior military officials.)  

In early 2006, rumors were rife about an impending army coup. In response, Thaksin's general officer classmates from the Armed Forces Prep School (Class 10) secretly proposed to create an off-the-books operations center to track coup group units and key participants. Thaksin apparently decided that the secret center should be co-located at the headquarters of the army's Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division, situated in Bangkok's Dusit district neighborhood, according to military sources. 
The Class 10-led anti-coup operations center was tasked with tracking the movements and locations of all potential coup forces, thought then to be centered at the Royal Thai Army (RTA) 

Special Warfare Center at Lopburi, 100 miles (160 kilometers) north of Bangkok. 
Although never revealed to the media, this anti-coup operations center was very successful in tracking coup planners and was also largely responsible for eventual coup leader and then army chief General Sonthi Boonyaratklin's cancellation of plans for the original coup, which had been plotted for the hours before the polls opened for the May 1, 2006, national parliamentary elections. 
While Thaksin never publicly announced that he had uncovered the coup plot, he did let Sonthi know that he was aware of their actions and would arrest the coup group's members if they continued. After the May 2006 elections were botched on legal technicalities, Sonthi went back to quietly planning another coup which included a much larger force, including Royal Guard units, to reinforce the Special Forces units he had originally recruited.  

This second planned coup, launched on September 19, 2006, was successful mainly because one of Thaksin's own Class 10 allies, Lieutenant General Anupong Paochinda, then the commanding officer in charge of the 1st Army Region which crucially oversees Bangkok's security, double-crossed his classmates and became one of the coup group's leaders. Thaksin's supporters later accused Prem of orchestrating the coup from behind the scenes - charges the elder statesman has denied.  

During the 2010 red-shirt protests, most of the demonstrators who arrived from the country's north and northeastern regions, pro-Thaksin geographical strongholds, spent several days in a central area of Bangkok. That area, situated in northern Bangkok on the west side of the Vipavadee super highway and the main rail line running north, later became a main logistics hub for the movement. 
The hub was close to Wat Don Muang, a large Buddhist temple which for years has catered to the spiritual needs of northeastern immigrants who moved to the capital during the economic boom in the 1980s and 1990s. It therefore made logistical sense that the war room be situated in this same area, which offered the red-shirt protesters a friendly, familiar support base of sympathetic residents as well as ready transportation connections, including the local Don Muang airport, to their home provinces.  

Although the exact location of the 2010 war room was never revealed, senior military officials familiar with the situation say that a Don Muang area hotel which had fallen on hard financial times after the opening of the new Suvarnabhumi international airport east of the capital was used as a base.  

With proper security, a mostly vacant hotel served such an operation well by providing both sleeping rooms for officials, hot meals, as well as easy communications - although in practice war room instructions to red-shirt operators were hand-delivered in order to counter government electronic eavesdropping capabilities, according to military sources familiar with the situation.  

Existing infrastructureGiven this existing red-shirt infrastructure, military officials believe the new Thaksin-ordered Ministry of Defense-led (MOD) war room will be situated in the same general area near Wat Don Muang. This is even more likely, they say, considering that the MOD has new facilities situated on the north side of Bangkok.  

While the personal office of the minister of defense is still located in Bangkok's old town, near the Grand Palace and Sanaam Luang, for the past 14 years (since 1997) most of the subordinate staff sections have been based at Muang Thong Thani in a single large 14-story office building. 
This building, approximately 15 kilometers north of Don Muang airport adjacent to the super highway to Ayutthaya, was originally part of a development which went bankrupt in the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis and was later purchased by the MOD.  

In 2009, in a project initiated by then-minister of defense General Prawit Wongsuwan, two massive 20-story buildings were constructed to serve as living quarters for all assigned officers, non-commissioned officers and their families. While the Sanaam Luang and current Muang Thong Thani locations will still be retained as office spaces, the 2009 plan calls for most of the government-provided housing for the ministry to be consolidated at this new campus.  

It is thus conceivable that one of these two new buildings will also have enough extra space to be utilized as another secret operating location for Thaksin's new war room. The secret command center will reportedly be staffed in rotation by four teams, each 30 strong and consisting of a senior team leader, deputy team leader and senior operations officer, according to military officers familiar with the order. Four rotating teams will ensure that the war room operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week, according to military sources familiar with the plan.  

The same senior military sources say that three potential senior team leaders have already been recruited to join the war room, all of them Class 10 classmates of Thaksin and all veterans of the 2010 red-shirt secret command. They include General (retired) Phonchai Kranloet, Lieutenant General (retired) Manas Paorik, and Lieutenant General Prin Suwanathat, the cousin of new minister of defense Sukamphon. (None of the three officers could be reached for comment for this article.)  

Additionally, an information technology (IT) support team comprised of a dozen IT experts will support the operation, a crucial component given the latest in high-tech communications equipment that is scheduled to be utilized. In contrast to the 2010 protests, current plans involve equipping frontline red-shirt column leaders with handheld, encrypted communications devices, allowing for more immediate, continuous and centralized control than in 2010.  

This could be an indication that the war room is planning to direct even larger protests than the 2010 red-shirt demonstrations, which often dwindled in number yet were widely portrayed as an organic pro-democracy movement. Conversely, however, it makes the new war room at least potentially vulnerable to the army's electronic intercept and jamming capabilities.  

Unsteady peace Notwithstanding these moves and maneuvers, it is not certain that Thailand will suffer a repeat of the chaos and violence witnessed in 2010. If opposition to constitutional amendments fails to coalesce into a countervailing mass movement, and if Thaksin can finesse rather than ram the promotion of enough of his military loyalists to make action against his sister's government more difficult, his aims may yet be achieved peacefully.  

One early indication of the future political course will come when the mid-year military reshuffle of senior military officers is announced in April. There are two such reshuffles each year, one in April, the other in October, with most important personnel moves taken in October. If Thaksin plans to remove Prayuth, as some believe Sukampon's appointment indicates, the provocative move would most likely be made in October rather than April.   

The degree to which Thaksin loyalists within the military are favored and current army leaders transferred, and the behind the scenes struggle that ensues over devising what is expected to be a hotly contested reshuffle list in April, may well indicate whether a political showdown is on the cards.  

The planned formation of a new war room, however, suggests that Thaksin himself foresees the potential for new instability and his loyal forces are now taking pre-emptive action. Indeed, the issues at stake are so profound, essentially control over the political system for the foreseeable future and command of the armed forces ahead of a delicate royal succession, that compromise between competing pro- and anti-Thaksin camps may no longer be possible.  

John Cole and Steve Sciacchitano spent several years in Thailand while on active duty with the US Army. Both were trained as Foreign Area Officers specializing in Southeast Asia and graduated from the Royal Thai Army's Command and General Staff College. They are now retired and the views expressed here are their own. 

Sufficiency economy pondered upon

"Sufficiency economy" can be better understood if it is seen as something quite uniquely Thai, with all its cultural nuances and non-translatable terms. It could be better understood if one is able to speak Thai and has followed its debate, discourse, promotion and implementation in the Thai language. When one tries to explain it in English, there are frustrating confusions, such as, is it an economic thought? Or is it a Buddhist philosophy? Is it the same as sustainable development or environmental sustainability? Most importantly, is it worth discussing or can it be applied anywhere else but in Thailand?

The person explaining from the Thai point of view can't explain it sufficiently, first, because of that frustrating incompatibility of the English language for explaining many Thai concepts. On top of that he/she is also challenged to apply western economic concepts to something that is more an expression of Buddhist philosophical thought than an economic thought. One speaks about the mind and its effects on the quality of life while the other speaks about quantitative monetary concepts. One calls for a middle way that considers family and community relationships and environmental responsibility, while the other is just looking for cost efficiency or the best price that expresses the right balance between supply and demand. How do you quantify the diverse levels of how each unique individual defines what is "sufficient" for him or his community? Price, demand, supply, efficiency, etc. becomes hopelessly inadequate as measurements. How does one quantify generosity or charity or a 'right' mind? Because sufficiency economy fails to answer these questions, its critics declare that it is not an economic thought nor a viable economic model.

The story of sufficiency economy developed in Thailand nearly along the same timeline as the story of how sustainability caught on as desired developmental goal recognized by the UN in 1972 at the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, popularized 15 years later with the Brundtland report (1987) and adopted as a major wold challenge at the Rio Earth Summit (1992). In Thailand, sufficiency economy was being shaped and implemented as an economic thought since the late fifties/early sixties when a young king travelled laboriously around his country initiating development projects where he could to better the lives of people in remote areas.

Despite its current popularity, sufficiency economy is not a mainstream economic model in Thailand. It is more like a supplementary prescription for the shaping of economic activities to counteract the ills of a dominantly capitalistic model. Sufficiency economy as an alternative economic thinking is one that is gaining ground one poor village by one poor village converted, as individuals who were inspired by its principals implemented and demonstrated successful local action again and again. In many cases, villages that could not feed themselves started growing their own food as an alternative to growing cash crops that had only caused them to become increasingly indebted. Instead of buying expensive fertilizers, they have expanded the supply of organic food, some even becoming successful with an export niche market.  At the same time, depleted forests are being regenerated and a future in which environmental and community awareness where values such as love, friendship, and generosity gain triumph over profit and greed are being re-enforced.

A recent article, "Sufficiency Economy" was published by PETER JANSSEN on The Manila Bulletin (http://www.mb.com/, December 27, 2010:  http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/295104/sufficiency-economy), focused on a Thai abbot at Doi Pha Som forest temple (วัดธาตุดอยผาส้ม) in Chiang Mai, Sorayut Chayapanyo (พระสรยุทธ ชยปัญโญ), who had rebuilt an old temple, regenerated the surrounding forest, and helped villages grow out of debt. Stanford educated, but rejecting that privileged knowledge, he explains sufficiency economy as not being 'anti-capitalist' nor 'anti-Western', but as something between market economy and socialism. Sufficiency economy was shown as being meaningful in impoverished rural areas where access to the market economy was difficult. Money or greed were no longer the main locomotive of local economic activities once people learnt how to search for ways to become dependant on what they had.

This was not a new story for me. I have heard many very interesting local stories of how poverty was transformed into resourcefulness over the years adopting those principals proposed by the Thai King, proposed in his annual speech of 1972. What this story gave to me, this time, was the realization that it was the availability and strength of a localized social network or social structures, very particular to Thailand or maybe a Buddhist society, that plays an important role in nurturing the emergence of leadership or inspired action by individuals in the successful implementation of a sufficiency economic model.

Before Thailand became a modern economy with its building blocks in the late fifties/early sixties, much of its rural economy, community life or social fabric was structured around the temple. The temple was not simply a religious institution, it was also the place where education was being given, funds being raised for community development, and where the binds of society were formed and strengthened. In many cases, it was the ground where many non-monetary activities were supplementing the economic livelihood of its communities, with its festivals and fairs, funerals, alms giving and donations.

This was a social network that encouraged individuals to make a difference, usually with very small means.  As the modern economy grew, the state and modern markets took over much of the role that the temple played. Festivals are now just commercial events hosted on government grounds. They don't do much for that very personal tie that binds. As a modern Thai, I don't remind myself the value of giving each single day as my mother does, just by consistently getting up every morning to cook rice for a group of passing monks.

When I read yet another story of how one person transforms a community, it dawned on me that poverty is not converted by economic intervention, but by changing the emphasis on our values. When we review what we want of the world by starting a review of  our minds, not from the point of view of what objects or things we need, but from a point of view of what qualities in life we really need to make us contented, we can come to realize that we really don't need all those consumerist products and services the markets try to push on us. We then realize that we don't need to focus on chasing money so much when we can focus on just trying to define what makes us contented.

Note: An older post I wrote: "Self-sufficiency or sustainable development"

Linguistic diversity in Thailand

Recently meeting a linguistic student the other day, I surprised him by declaring that Kmer and Thai did not belong to the same family group. He thought they belonged to the same linguistic family.  I had a vague memory of a classification of the three large linguistic families of Southeast Asian languages I had read in Joachim Schiiesinger's "Ethnic Groups of Thailand: Non-Tai Speaking Peoples of Thailand" (published by White Lotus Press, 2000.)  I looked up this book as soon as I got home, just to make sure I hadn't made a rash declaration. Sure enough, page 8, a diagram, adapted from James A. Matisoff, "Linguistic Diversity and Language Contact", in John MacKinnon and Wanat Bhruksasri, eds, Highlanders of Thailand (Oxfort University Press, 1983): The three linguistic superstocks of Southeast Asia:

1. Austro-Asiatic, to which belongs the languages of Munda (India), Nicobarese, Mon-Kmer (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, China, Assam), and Aslian (Malaysia).
2. Austro-Thai, to which belongs the sub-family languages called Austronesian, Tai-Kadai, and Mioa-Yao.
3. Sino-Tibetan, subdivided into Chinese and Tibeto-Burman.

Now if you're not a linguist (which I'm not, but I'm an extremely curious person), it's easy and forgivable to make a simple and common conclusion that people of same geographic region will be speaking similar and related languages. However, it turns out that Southeast Asia is one of the most diverse and linguistic regions of the world. My new linguist friend, who specialized in Spanish and is more interested in learning about prehispanic languages, of course, was not expected to know this.

How would you explain to people who don't have a clue, the minefield of linguistics? What exactly do linguists do? Well, my husband's niece who had decided to go into that field of study, is now working on the construction of a dictionary of Spanglish, of all things. I met another, who worked with a computer software company, using her speciality in Latin, putting a natural order to computer programming. Then, there's a blogger I avidly follow who doesn't write so much about linguistics as much as she writes about Thai cooking!

Wikipedia says, "linguistics is the scientific study of natural language". It also goes on to say that there are several sub-fields (ie, grammar and semantics), and sub-disciplines (ie, evolutionary liguistics, historical linguistics, sociolinguistics, neurolinguistics, language acquisition, discourse analysis, and pragmatics), and even relate fields (like phonetics).  Interestingly, "outside the field, this term is commonly used to refer to people who speak many languages fluently".

So from the understanding derived from reading the above wiki article, the classification of family languages falls under historical linguistics, branching out from philology, the study of ancient texts.  Well, if you're in interested in what linguistics is all about just keep following those numerous links provided by wikipedia. I hope it will inspire you to develop a keener interest in what linguistics is about, if not to be fascinated enough to become one yourself.  Meanwhile, I'm looking at the topic heading that I put up and sees that it's saying "Linguistic diversity in Thailand"!

What then is the distinction between Austro-Asiatic and Austro-Thai? "Austro" means south, so therefore, Austro-Asiatic is basically South Asia. That is an interesting revelation, because only a small group of people are left that speak Austro-Asiatic (Munda) in India which geographically is considered South Asia.  Instead, the language of the Indians are mainly of the Indo-European and Dravidian language groups. Another quirk of linguistics.

The grouping of the language family of Austro-Tai is based on a hypothesis that the Tai-Kadai and Austronesian language families of southern China and the Pacific are genealogically related. There are a number of possible cognates in the core vocabulary.  The word for rice, for example.

While what is seen on the surface is that the Thai language is THE one and only official language of Thailand, in reality a multitude of languages and dialects are spoken in Thailand. I enjoy being able to point out the differences of Isaan dialects spoken in Northeastern Thailand. Sakon Nakhon, where my family is from, has a special kind of sing song lilt (influenced by Puthai) that in my opinion makes it sound softer than for example the dialect of its neighboring province of Kalasin. Nobody will deny that the dialect of the North is different from the dialect of the Northeast, even if we can quite easily understand each other, but have a Southerner speak his dialect to me and I'm lost, but not as lost as having a Karen hilltribe speak to me.

The book, "Linguistic Diversity and National Unity", by William A. Smalley (1994), singularizes the success of Thailand's official language policy. Unlike other multi-ethnic nations, such as Myanmar and India, where official language policy has sparked bloody clashes, Thailand has maintained relative stability despite its eighty languages. 

Another notch on the belt for Thailand, it seems.

What the pots tell about the past

This article, written by Chris Baker, was published by BTHE MING GAP AND SHIPWRECK CERAMICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIAangkok Post's Outlook section on 16/08/2010.

It is a review of the book, "THE MING GAP AND SHIPWRECK CERAMICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Towards a Chronology of Thai Trade Ware" by Roxanna Maude Brown, printed by The Siam Society and River Books, 208pp, 895 baht, ISBN 978-9749863770.

Ceramics have played a rather niche role in the history of Siam. The ceramics trade was not mentioned at all in the royal chronicles, and hardly at all by foreign visitors whose commercial interests lay elsewhere. The study of ceramics has largely been left to art historians who focus on design. Yet anyone who has cycled along the Yom River in Si Satchanalai past the amazing number of old kilns, ranging from burrows in the riverbank to great multi-chambered brick constructions (some now made into splendid museums), must wonder about the larger historical significance of this trade.

Roxanna Brown had begun to probe that significance. This book is her doctoral thesis from UCLA in 2004, accepted for publication by the Siam Society before her sad and senseless death two years ago. The thesis tests the theory that there was a "Ming Gap" - a period from the late 14th to late 16th centuries when a ban on exports from China allowed Southeast Asian production of ceramics to flourish. But the thesis goes far, far beyond answering this single question.

Since 1974, over 120 wrecks have been found with some cargo of Southeast Asian ceramics. A few have been the subject of thorough archaeological studies. Others have been surveyed by private enthusiasts. Many have been looted, with the pots turning up in museums, private collections and flea markets. Brown assembled all the data available on these wrecks, and then devised ingenious methods to organise them into a chronology.

With this data, she offers a precise but complex answer to questions about a Ming Gap. In the last third of the 14th century, when the emperor banned private overseas trade, the proportion of Chinese ceramics in Southeast Asian trade fell from 100 percent to 30-40 percent. It then fell again to only 5 percent through the middle of the 15th century. From 1488 to 1505, there was a sudden flood of Chinese blue-and-white, then another lapse until the export ban was lifted in 1567.

The findings which Brown made along the way to this conclusion are ultimately much more exciting than this exercise in dating. In the past, "experts" dated Siamese ceramics based on design, using a theory that designs became more complex and sophisticated over time. But Brown shows that ceramics of many different types with widely varying complexity of design were found on the very same wrecks. She proposes an outline history of the various kiln sites and their products, and this handful of pages is the highlight of the book.

Vietnamese kilns were the first to move into the gap vacated by the Chinese, but they were soon overtaken by Siamese sites, especially Sawankhalok (Si Satchanalai). In the dying years of the 14th century, potters in Sukhothai and Sawankhalok learned how to paint black designs under a transparent glaze, producing the well-known bowls and plates with fish and floral designs. Then around 1420, Sawankhalok potters discovered much finer clay and learned how to fire at much higher temperatures, resulting in the famous celadon. Sukhothai never replicated these techniques, but continued to churn out products in the old style in much larger quantities than Sawankhalok. For much of the Ming Gap, these products dominated the sea-borne ceramics trade.

In the early 16th century, Sawankalok reverted to the black underglaze, and a new technique combining brown and white glazing. Probably the sources of good clay were in decline, as the ribbon development of kilns along the Yom River suggests. Then in the 1580s, the whole area around Sukhothai and Sawankhalok was depopulated because of the growing conflict with Burma, and the kilns were abandoned. Sing Buri kilns had already established a niche for the production of storage jars, and now widened their repertoire to include many other items. Suphan Buri kilns specialised in large storage jars, often of extraordinary size. One fragment is estimated to have come from a jar with a capacity of 260 litres. A few items come from the Lanna kilns, especially at San Kamphaeng.

Brown's assembly of all the shipwreck data raises a host of new questions. The wrecks are only a random sample of the total maritime shipping, but they hint at the scale of the ceramics trade. Most of the junks were carrying from 5,000 to 15,000 pieces. One European vessel went down in 1751 with 100,000. The total quantities may have been massive. How did the shipments move from the northern kilns? Where were they loaded onto junks? Who controlled or taxed this trade? Who profited? What relationship is there between the rhythms of the ceramics trade and the course of Siam's political history?

Most wrecks were carrying a mixture of goods from different kilns in Siam, perhaps also with some Vietnamese ware, some Chinese pieces, and the odd pot from Burma or beyond. This mixture hints at a complex market structure, possibly with some major exchange centres. Where were they?

The book contains hundreds of photos of ceramic pieces. These are not the exquisitely arty pictures found in glossy magazines, but a scholar's records, sometimes snapped in museums, markets, and quaysides. They show the familiar plates and bowls but also a wonderful variety of storage containers and occasional decorative pieces. On the Sawankhalok celadon alone, the range of designs is breathtaking. These pictures attest to the technical and artistic skills of the potters, but also hint at the complexity and sophistication of the markets which demanded such variety.

Although this book seems to be a technical exercise laid out in charts and tables, the findings are much richer - the result of a feel for the subject that Roxanna Brown had developed over 30 years. The book answers one question but throws up many others which she had only just begun to explore. This book is a fitting memorial to a unique scholar, and a great legacy for all interested in the history of Southeast Asia.

Mor Lam and Monks

Mor lam, is a northeastern Thai tradition that is slowly dying due to the influence of pop music. It would be wonderful if a new generation of Isaan youngsters with talent could add new energy to this lyrical art.

An unforgetable talent that had helped keep this artform current was Pumpuang Duangjan, R.I.P. While there are current artists like Jintara Poonlarp, Siriporn Ampaipong, and even a Dutch singer Christy Gibson, these studio-produced mor lam pales in comparison to the excitement and appreciation of a spontaneous talent shown in the live sparing of a mor lam contest or performance among the Isaan people.

I was fortunate enough to witness one such performance at a young age.  Maybe multimillion Thai pop music studio businessmen can be tipped to fund these contests in the Isaan country side, in the way that Nelson Mandela did for South African rugby, as shown in the movie, Invictus, not only to promote the goodwill of Luk Tung, a local musical genre not imported from abroad, but to give a sense of pride in cultural identity of the young, as well as to discover new natural talent.

I had always thought that this musical form is in some ways similar to modern rap, only much more traditional. It challenges its performers to dig up the best use of language and rythm on the spot. The best perform from a memory or repertoire of word play, rythm, rhyme and metaphors. It's what I would call a neobaroque form of entertainment because the musical accompaniment is simple and repetitive yet intuitive and spontaneous. It's a whole performance that engages and pulls in its viewers or in this case audience and listeners.



So what does mor lam performances have to do with monks? 

I just recently read the history of Phra Ajaan Mun Bhuridatta Thera (1870-1949), the most venerable founder of Thailand's famous forest monk tradition. Here's what http://www.accesstoinsight.org/ says,

The unusual style of Phra Ajaan Mun's sermons may be explained in part by the fact that in the days before his ordination he was skilled in a popular form of informal village entertainment called maw lam. Maw lam is a contest in extemporaneous rhyming, usually reproducing the war between the sexes, in which the battle of wits can become quite fierce. Much use is made of word play: riddles, puns, innuendoes, metaphors, and simple playing with the sounds of words. The sense of language that Ajaan Mun developed in maw lam he carried over into his teachings after becoming a monk. Often he would teach his students in extemporaneous puns and rhymes. This sort of word play he even applied to the Pali language, ...

The best of buddhist teachings comes from oral traditions, in the forms of rhetorics, whether in the Tibetan debating or in this case the teachings of humble monks of Isaan origins, that towers above the more conventional Thervada style of Thailand's center. The language of mor lam and the language of forest monk tradition is Lao, which is (central Thais would probably love to deny) the true origin of the Thai language. Acharn Mun and other forest tradition monks had so internalized the teaching of the Buddha, which they had learnt in Pali, but it was practice and practice (of meditation) that allowed them to master the knowledge and thereby able to transmit in simple yet enlightening forms (in Lao) to their students and the common people. 

An interesting note to leave, pondering on oral tradition, links to languages, and preservations of cultures.

Acharn Mun passed away in 1940 at Wat Pa Suthawat, Sakon Nakhon. A small museum was built in his honor where there is an exhibit of his personal belongings and a brief account of his life.

Wax image of Pra Acharn Mun Bhuridatto, 

at Wat Pa Suthawat, Sakon Nakhon